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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5663
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
Schlagwörter: 
child labour
education
uncertainty
moral hazard
optimal taxation
JEL: 
D82
H21
H31
I28
J24
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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