Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51321
Authors: 
Kratzsch, Uwe
Sieg, Gernot
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Economics Department Working Paper Series 6
Abstract: 
Landing fees at airports are regulated almost all over the world since airports are assumed to abuse their market power. We find that monopolistic airports have an incentive to restrain landing fees when they generate additional non-aviation revenues and that the optimal landing fee decreases in the degree of complementarity of aviation and non-aviation. Furthermore, we show that monopolistic airports will not have an incentive to abuse their market power anymore so that a price regulation becomes inappropriate as soon as non-aviation revenues increase above 50% of all airport revenues.
Subjects: 
airport regulation
aviation and non-aviation revenues
complementarity of aviation and non-aviation
locational rents
JEL: 
L93
D42
L51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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