Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49699 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CeDEx Discussion Paper Series No. 2011-05
Verlag: 
The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx), Nottingham
Zusammenfassung: 
The standard chicken game is a popular model of certain important real scenarios but does not allow for the escalation behaviour these are typically associated with. This is problematic if the critical, final decisions in these scenarios are sensitive to previous escalation. We introduce and analyse, theoretically and by experiment, a new game which permits escalation behaviour. Compared with an equivalent chicken game, Pareto-suboptimal outcomes are significantly more frequent. This result is inconsistent with our rational choice analysis and possible psychological roots are explored.
Schlagwörter: 
escalation
brinkmanship
chicken game
experiments
JEL: 
C72
C78
C91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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