Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49677
Authors: 
Sousa, Sergio
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-06
Abstract: 
This paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable. Yet, our experiment shows that a sanctioning system cannot promote cooperative behaviour if enforcement is a low-probability event and free-riding behaviour is not often punished. This supports the view that punishment needs to be exercised to be feared, otherwise the simple threat of it cannot be effective in promoting cooperation.
Subjects: 
uncertain enforcement
public good game
altruistic punishment
decisionmaking under uncertainty
cooperation
JEL: 
C92
D81
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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