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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49675
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Gächter, Simon | en |
dc.contributor.author | Kessler, Esther | en |
dc.contributor.author | Königstein, Manfred | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-21 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-09-26T13:24:08Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-09-26T13:24:08Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49675 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust contracts without any incentives and implicit incentives coming from repeated interaction. Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottingham | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2011-06 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C70 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C90 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | principal-agent games | en |
dc.subject.keyword | gift-exchange experiments | en |
dc.subject.keyword | incomplete contracts, explicit incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | implicit incentives | en |
dc.subject.keyword | repeated games | en |
dc.subject.keyword | separability | en |
dc.subject.keyword | experiments | en |
dc.title | The roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 662542150 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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