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dc.contributor.authorGächter, Simonen
dc.contributor.authorKessler, Estheren
dc.contributor.authorKönigstein, Manfreden
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-21-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:08Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:08Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49675-
dc.description.abstractEfficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit incentives affect cooperation. We first show that there is substantial cooperation under non-incentive compatible contracts. Incentive-compatible contracts induce best-reply effort and crowd out any voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust contracts without any incentives and implicit incentives coming from repeated interaction. Implicit incentives have a strong positive effect on effort only under non-incentive compatible contracts.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2011-06en
dc.subject.jelC70en
dc.subject.jelC90en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordprincipal-agent gamesen
dc.subject.keywordgift-exchange experimentsen
dc.subject.keywordincomplete contracts, explicit incentivesen
dc.subject.keywordimplicit incentivesen
dc.subject.keywordrepeated gamesen
dc.subject.keywordseparabilityen
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.titleThe roles of incentives and voluntary cooperation for contractual compliance-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn662542150en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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