Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49467
Authors: 
Ben-Yashar, Ruth
Danziger, Leif
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3501
Abstract: 
This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the symmetric assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet, a symmetric composition of committees is not always optimal. In other words, decision makers with different skill levels should not generally be evenly divided among the committees. However, in the special case of only two skill levels, it is optimal to compose the committees evenly.
Subjects: 
committees
collective decision making
simple majority rule
JEL: 
D70
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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