Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/47340 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Memorandum No. 2010,01
Publisher: 
University of Oslo, Department of Economics, Oslo
Abstract: 
This paper provides a definition of epistemic stability of sets of strategy profiles, and uses it to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies and minimal curb sets.
Subjects: 
Epistemic game theory
epistemic stability
rationalizability
closedness under rational behavior
mutual p-belief
JEL: 
C72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
261.84 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.