Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46727 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
1995
Citation: 
[Publisher:] Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW) [Place:] Kiel [Year:] 1995
Series/Report no.: 
Kiel Working Paper No. 705
Publisher: 
Kiel Institute of World Economics (IfW), Kiel
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the GATT negotiations during the Uruguay Round and shows that France was induced to accept a more free trade oriented package due to her integration into the European community. The importance of the European economic and diplomatic relationships led France to accept a GATT deal which she felt would be disadvantageous. Further, the paper investigates how this finding fits into the literature of the political economy of trade policy and how it can be incorporated into a game theoretic model of endogenous tariff making.
Subjects: 
Regionalism
Uruguay Round
European Union
Tariffs
Bargaining Model
JEL: 
C78
F13
F15
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Document Version: 
Digitized Version

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