Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46515
Autor:innen: 
Calmfors, Lars
Wren-Lewis, Simon
Datum: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3382
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper analyses theoretically what role fiscal councils could play and surveys empirically the activities of existing councils. Case studies of the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council and the UK Office for Budget Responsibility are done. It is concluded that fiscal councils should be advisory, rather than decision-making, and work as complements, rather than substitutes, to fiscal rules. A key issue is the political fragility of fiscal councils and how their long-run viability should be secured. Three ways of guaranteeing their independence are suggested: (1) reputation-building; (2)formal national rules; and (3) international monitoring.
Schlagwörter: 
deficit bias
fiscal rules
fiscal councils
JEL: 
H60
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
265.12 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.