Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46464
Authors: 
Ke, Changxia
Konrad, Kai A.
Morath, Florian
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3302
Abstract: 
Our experimental analysis of alliances in conflicts leads to three main findings. First, even in the absence of repeated interaction, direct contact or communication, free-riding among alliance members is far less pronounced than what would be expected from non-cooperative theory. Second, this possible solidarity among 'brothers in arms' when fighting against an outside enemy may rapidly deteriorate or disappear as soon as the outside enemy disappears. Third, when fighting an outside enemy, 'brothers in arms' may already anticipate future internal conflict about dividing the spoils of winning; however, this subsequent internal conflict does not discourage alliance members from expending much effort in the contest against the external enemy.
Subjects: 
alliance
conflict
contest
free-riding
hold-up problem
solidarity
JEL: 
D72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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