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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46450
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Moreno-Bromberg, Santiago | en |
dc.contributor.author | Taschini, Luca | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-05-25 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-29T11:19:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-06-29T11:19:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46450 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and allowance price are generated endogenously and are inter-dependent. It is shown that the non-cooperative permit trading game possesses a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the allowance value reflects the level of uncovered pollution (demand), the level of unused allowances (supply), and the technological status. These conditions are also satisfied when a price support instrument, which is contingent on the adoption of the new technology, is introduced. Numerical investigation confirms that this policy generates a floating price floor for the allowances, and it restores the dynamic incentives to invest. Given that this policy comes at a cost, a criterion for the selection of a self-financing policy (based on convex risk measures) is proposed and implemented. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunich | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aCESifo Working Paper |x3399 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D80 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H20 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L50 | en |
dc.subject.jel | Q50 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.stw | Emissionsrechte | en |
dc.subject.stw | Emissionshandel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Umweltschutzinvestition | en |
dc.subject.stw | Technologiewahl | en |
dc.subject.stw | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Pollution permits, strategic trading and dynamic technology adoption | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 660160374 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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