Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46447
Authors: 
Kemnitz, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Social Protection 3220
Abstract: 
This paper investigates competition between health insurance companies under different financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German health care reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees (health premia). We find that contribution rate competition yields lower company profits and higher consumer welfare than premia competition when switching between insurance companies is costly.
Subjects: 
health care reform
competition
consumer choice
JEL: 
I11
I18
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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