Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46442
Authors: 
Andersen, Jørgen Juel
Fiva, Jon H.
Natvik, Gisle James
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Choice 3167
Abstract: 
Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how turnout is affected by exogenous variation in governments' financial flexibility to provide pork for their voters. By utilizing simultaneous elections for different offices, we identify a positive effect of election stakes on turnout.
Subjects: 
voter motivation
elections
turnout
JEL: 
D72
H71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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