Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46413 
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3478
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
A wide variety of social protection systems coexist within the EU. Some member states provide social insurance that is of Beveridgean inspiration (with universal and more or less flat benefits), while others offer a system that is mainly Bismarckian (with benefits related to past contributions). Labor mobility raises concerns about the sustainability of the most generous and redistributive (Beveridgean) insurance systems. We address this issue in a twocountry setting, where individuals differ in mobility cost (attachment to their native country). A Bismarckian insurance system is not affected by migration while a Beveridgean one is. Our results suggest that the race-to-the-bottom affecting tax rates may be more important under Beveridge-Beveridge competition than under Beveridge-Bismarck competition. Finally, we study the strategic choice of the type of social protection. We show that Bismarckian governments may find it beneficial to adopt a Beveridgean insurance system.
Subjects: 
social insurance
tax competition
mobility
economic integration
JEL: 
H23
H70
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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