Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46273
Authors: 
Frydman, Carola
Jenter, Dirk
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Labour Markets 3277
Abstract: 
This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research.
Subjects: 
executive compensation
managerial incentives
incentive compensation
equity compensation
option compensation
corporate governance
JEL: 
D20
G30
J30
J31
J33
J41
M52
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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