Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079
Authors: 
Addison, John T.
Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
Kuhn, Thomas
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit 5170
Abstract: 
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
Subjects: 
matching unemployment
public employment service
delegation problem
moral hazard
search theory
JEL: 
J64
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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