Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/46079
Autoren: 
Addison, John T.
Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
Kuhn, Thomas
Datum: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5170
Zusammenfassung: 
The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
Schlagwörter: 
matching unemployment
public employment service
delegation problem
moral hazard
search theory
JEL: 
J64
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
736.13 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.