Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43451
Authors: 
Tavoni, Alessandro
Schlüter, Maja
Levin, Simon
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,127
Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
Subjects: 
Cooperation
Social Norm
Ostracism
Common Pool Resource
Evolutionary Game Theory
Replicator Equation
Agent-based Simulation
Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics
JEL: 
C73
Q20
D70
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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