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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2010,127
Verlag: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the role of pro-social behavior as a mechanism for the establishment and maintenance of cooperation in resource use under variable social and environmental conditions. By coupling resource stock dynamics with social dynamics concerning compliance to a social norm prescribing non-excessive resource extraction in a common pool resource (CPR), we show that when reputational considerations matter and a sufficient level of social stigma affects the violators of a norm, sustainable outcomes are achieved. We find large parameter regions where norm-observing and norm-violating types coexist, and analyze to what extent such coexistence depends on the environment.
Schlagwörter: 
Cooperation
Social Norm
Ostracism
Common Pool Resource
Evolutionary Game Theory
Replicator Equation
Agent-based Simulation
Coupled Socio-resource Dynamics
JEL: 
C73
Q20
D70
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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