Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41568
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dc.contributor.authorÖhler, Hannesen_US
dc.contributor.authorNunnenkamp, Peteren_US
dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-02en_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-15T10:26:57Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-15T10:26:57Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41568-
dc.description.abstractPerformance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appear to weaken the incentive to fight corruption over time. We conclude that - if designed properly - conditionality can work.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aCeGE |cGöttingenen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion papers // CeGE |x103en_US
dc.subject.jelF35en_US
dc.subject.jelO17en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordForeign Aiden_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordMillennium Challenge Corporationen_US
dc.subject.keywordMCC Effecten_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfekonditionenen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken_US
dc.subject.stwBilaterale Entwicklungshilfeen_US
dc.subject.stwAmerikanischen_US
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen_US
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren_US
dc.titleDoes conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid schemeen_US
dc.type|aWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn630517819en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:103-

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