Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/41568 
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dc.contributor.authorÖhler, Hannesen
dc.contributor.authorNunnenkamp, Peteren
dc.contributor.authorDreher, Axelen
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-02-
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-15T10:26:57Z-
dc.date.available2010-11-15T10:26:57Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/41568-
dc.description.abstractPerformance-based aid has been proposed as an alternative to the failed traditional approach whereby donors make aid conditional on the reform promises of recipient countries. However, hardly any empirical evidence exists on whether ex post rewards are effective in inducing reforms. We attempt to fill this gap by investigating whether the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was successful in promoting better control of corruption. We employ a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) approach, considering different ways of defining the treatment group as well as different time periods during which incentive effects could have materialized. We find evidence of strong anticipation effects immediately after the announcement of the MCC, while increasing uncertainty about the timing and amount of MCC aid appear to weaken the incentive to fight corruption over time. We conclude that - if designed properly - conditionality can work.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversity of Göttingen, Center for European, Governance and Economic Development Research (cege) |cGöttingenen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|acege Discussion Papers |x103en
dc.subject.jelF35en
dc.subject.jelO17en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordForeign Aiden
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordMillennium Challenge Corporationen
dc.subject.keywordMCC Effecten
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungshilfekonditionenen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwKriminalpolitiken
dc.subject.stwBilaterale Entwicklungshilfeen
dc.subject.stwAmerikanischen
dc.subject.stwWirkungsanalyseen
dc.subject.stwEntwicklungsländeren
dc.titleDoes conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn630517819en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cegedp:103en

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