Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/39020
Authors: 
Choi, Jay Pil
Gerlach, Heiko A.
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Industrial Organisation 3005
Abstract: 
In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust cooperation between agencies. When international antitrust prosecution is uncoordinated, multi-market contact allows firms to reduce the amount of self-reporting in equilibrium and sustain cartels more effectively. We then discuss the effects of information sharing among antitrust authorities as a function of how much and which type of information is exchanged. We show that extensive information sharing might have an adverse effect on self-reporting by cartel members.
Subjects: 
cartel formation
multi-market contact
leniency programs
international antitrust cooperation
JEL: 
L13
L41
D43
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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