Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38991
Authors: 
Cornes, Richard
Hartley, Roger
Tamura, Yuji
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper Public Finance 3060
Abstract: 
We set out a model of production and appropriation involving many players, who differ with respect to both resource endowments and productivities. We write down the model in a novel way that permits our analysis to avoid the proliferation of dimensions associated with the best response function approach as the number of heterogeneous players increases. We establish existence of a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and carry out some comparative static exercises.
Subjects: 
conflict
noncooperative games
aggregative games
JEL: 
C72
D74
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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