Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
CSIO working paper 0064
This paper analyzes simultaneous ascending auctions of two different items, viewed as complements by multi-item bidders. The finding is that such auctions overly concentrate the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly diffuse them to single-item bidders. The main reason is that some bidders strictly want to jump-bid and jump-bidding allows the game to mimic a package auction, where single-item bidders cannot fully cooperate among themselves to bid against multi-item bidders. The second reason is that over-concentration causes resale and there is an equilibrium where a multi-item bidder becomes the reseller and chooses to under-sell the goods.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
387.05 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.