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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2026
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 26-026
Verlag: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
Many countries limit how long a worker may be kept on a temporary contract, yet little is known about how firms and workers respond when this maximum duration is tightened. Does a shorter cap simply displace temporary jobs, or does it push firms towards permanent hiring? I provide causal evidence on this duration margin using a 2001 German reform that restricted temporary contracts longer than two years in previously exempt small firms. Using difference-in-differences combined with propensity-score matching, I find that new jobs became around five percentage points more likely to start with a permanent contract, that contract durations bunched at the cap, and that overall employment was not adversely affected. Once the first capped contracts matured, turnover of short-tenure workers rose by a third to a half, but conversions to permanent contracts dominated this churn margin, and post-reform labour-market entrants saw higher early-career earnings and job stability. The findings speak directly to the current debate over lengthening such caps, including Germany's plan to double its own from two to four years.
Schlagwörter: 
Temporary Employment
Employment Protection
Labour Market Segmentation
Germany
JEL: 
J21
J41
J68
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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