Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339345 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 460
Versionsangabe: 
Revised version, July 2025
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
Economic agents often infer latent structures - such as preference types - from data, without exogenously specified priors. We model such agents as empirical Bayesians. They estimate both the prior over types and the meanings of types via maximum likelihood. We show this estimation is equivalent to decomposing the sample into subsamples, each best explained by a single available latent type, with the decomposition minimizing the average misfit. The equivalence yields structural properties: optimal latent representations are robust (type definitions locally invariant to data changes) and simple (type count bounded). We extend these properties to agents who face frictions in evaluating likelihoods.
Schlagwörter: 
Bayesian updating
cognitive constraints
belief formation
machine learning in economics
Bayesian networks
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Sonstige Angaben: 
This paper builds on and supersedes our previous paper, "Constrained Data-Fitters"
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
650.75 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.