Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339344 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 484
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
This paper studies mediation in infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring. In departure from the literature, we assume that all private messages and internal records are publicly revealed at the end of each stage. We call the resulting equilibrium concept mediated subgame perfect equilibrium (MSPE). It is shown that the revelation principle holds. We introduce an effective correlated minimax value, which can be conveniently determined as the solution of a linear program, and use it to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the implementability of payoffs under an MSPE. These conditions are standard for two-player games with a sufficient degree of patience but are, in general, strictly more permissive. Examples illustrate the impact of effective correlated minimax profiles and the subtle role of internal records.
Subjects: 
Infinitely repeated games
mediation
revelation principle
perfect folk theorem
effective minimax value
correlated equilibrium
threat points
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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