Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338399 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2026
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12435
Verlag: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We examine whether the public revelation of sensitive tax information prompts firms to adopt reputation repair policies targeting shareholders. Between 2013 and 2021, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) released leaked information on over 800,000 offshore entities incorporated in tax havens, publicly revealing their use by multinational firms to avoid taxes. Leveraging this setting, we investigate whether firms implicated in the leaks improve their governance, increase investor remuneration, and reorganize their activities to restore shareholder trust relative to unaffected firms. We find that, after the leaks, firms appoint more directors, especially in operations, audit, and finance and accounting, pay higher dividends, and reduce their presence in tax havens, without increasing effective tax rates. Additional analyses suggest that concerns about managerial diversion and public scrutiny may drive these responses. Overall, data leaks appear to change the cost-benefit trade-off of tax strategies in ways that are, on net, favorable to shareholders.
Schlagwörter: 
offshore subsidiaries
tax havens
data leaks
corporate governance
dividend payouts
reputation repair
JEL: 
G30
H25
L14
M41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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