Zusammenfassung:
While the populations of wealthy modern states primarily identify with their nation, middle- and low-income countries often contain large populations that adhere to distinct subnational identities. We model a central government elite that has a conflictual relationship with its “tribal rimland.” Elites share a dominant national identity, while members of tribes may hold alternative identities, with identities conferring psychological payoffs. Elite investment in state capacity increases material production, strengthens incentives for members of tribes to adopt the national identity, and facilitates extraction from those who continue to adhere to their own identity. Tribes, meanwhile, are better able to resist when their strategies of resistance, collective organization, and identity status remain strong. Increased democratic representation does not necessarily favor the persistence of tribal identity relative to elite rule. The model is consistent with accounts of incorporation and resistance from both history and the present, ranging from the Scottish and Southeast Asian highlands to past and present indigenous societies in the Americas.
