Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338376 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2026
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12412
Verlag: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Public acceptance has influenced the evolution of carbon capture and storage (CCS) in Europe. To study the mechanisms behind this, we use evolutionary game theory where the governmental policy towards CCS, such as subsidies to the industry, is dependent on public acceptance. Public acceptance further depends on the perceived benefits and costs for individuals of CCS. We show that in this model, multiple equilibria may exist, and the starting point as well as the heterogeneity of firms will determine the equilibrium that will be reached over time. While the subsidy is tied to public acceptance, the government can affect development by correcting other imperfections in the market. Using such policy instruments, a new equilibrium may develop with a higher share of investments in CCS. The model also suggests an explanation of the different situations in many countries today with respect to CCS investments and investment plans.
Schlagwörter: 
carbon capture and storage
evolutionary games
public acceptance
climate change
JEL: 
C73
H23
Q35
Q38
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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