Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338291 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11521
Versionsangabe: 
This Version: December 2025
Verlag: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
Contrary to the standard economic view of misreporting for material gain, recent evidence highlights robust preferences for truth-telling. Models consistent with aggregate behavior attribute these preferences to intrinsic honesty and social image concerns. We introduce a novel incentivized measure that independently identifies both motives at the individual level. It exhibits strong internal validity, predicts behavior in established honesty paradigms, and uncovers stable preference types across samples. We also propose a 2-minute survey module predicting behavior in a standard reporting task. Implemented in a large panel, the module allows us to shed light on how early-life experiences shape preferences for truth-telling.
Schlagwörter: 
honesty
lying costs
social image concerns
intentions
individual preferences
JEL: 
C91
D01
D82
D91
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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