Zusammenfassung:
Private money creation lies at the heart of currency competition due to seigniorage rents that are an important contributor to banks' franchise values. However, it undermines the role of central bank in money provision and has been historically a contentious issue. As shifting from private to public money may come at a cost of bank disintermediation and affect economic growth, such a swap should be well-planned to minimize its costs. In this paper, we study the transition from private to public money in a historical context. The 1897 banking law in Sweden granted the banknote monopoly to the Swedish central bank. To facilitate the shift, the central bank provided preferential liquidity support to formerly note-issuing private banks. Drawing on newly digitized monthly archival data, we show that this liquidity provision played a critical role in shaping private banks' performances during the transition. Once the support started being withdrawn, affected banks experienced a 23% drop in profitability. No signs of bank disintermediation are found.