Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336040 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12339
Publisher: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
Using a behavioral game-theoretical model and an experiment we study how information and communication influence coordination in groups when they can misreport the outcome of a binary lottery. Both group members receive a positive payoff only if their reports match. Consistent with our theory, nearly all groups coordinate when allowed to communicate prior to submitting their individual reports. The extent of coordination on either truth-telling or lying is correlated with the individual lying costs. Overall, both information and communication promote coordination on more dishonesty. These findings underscore how information and communication can increase coordination and dishonesty depending on intrinsic lying-aversion.
Subjects: 
group decisions
unethical behavior
lying
coordination
group video chat
JEL: 
C92
D70
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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