Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335174 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper No. 467
Version Description: 
Revised version, September 2025
Publisher: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Abstract: 
In noncooperative game theory, it is often taken for granted that expected payoffs are well-defined and independent of the integral representation. However, this need not be the case even if strategy spaces are compact and payoffs are bounded. In this paper, we establish general conditions under which the measurability requirements for working with expected payoffs are automatically met. We use our findings to enhance Glicksberg's equilibrium existence theorem and to rigorously construct the mixed extension of discontinuous games such as contests and auctions.
Subjects: 
Compact games
expected payoffs
measurability
Baire functions
Glicksberg's theorem
discontinuous games
u.s.c-l.s.c. minimax theorem
JEL: 
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
older Version: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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