Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334865 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] The RAND Journal of Economics [ISSN:] 1756-2171 [Volume:] 56 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 655-667
Publisher: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Abstract: 
This article investigates a multi‐unit pay‐as‐bid procurement auction where the auctioneer fixes total spending and maximizes the quantity procured with their predetermined, secret budget. Previous literature has analyzed fixed‐quantity auctions, where the traded quantity is fixed but unknown to the bidders. Compared to such auctions, budget auctions lower the auctioneer's costs by introducing an additional interaction between a bidder's bids; bidders not only weigh a higher profit margin on a unit against a lower probability of supplying that unit; a higher margin on some unit also reduces the probability that the budget suffices to procure more units from the bidder.
Subjects: 
reverse auction
multi‐unit auction
procurement
pay‐as‐bid
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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