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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 12193
Verlag: 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research - CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores whether tax compliance would be affected if the tax payers are "status" seekers. If relative income is a symbol of relative status in a society, status concerned individuals would evade paying taxes more relative to the case where status is not a concern. However, such an outcome would not hold if the symbol of relative status is relative consumption of the "status" good and not relative income. We generalize the scenario by introducing a measure of relative status which depends on both relative income and consumption of the status good.
Schlagwörter: 
status-seeking behavior
tax evasion
relative income
conspicuous consumption
Inequality
JEL: 
H26
D31
D91
O15
H21
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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