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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Public Choice [ISSN:] 1573-7101 [Volume:] 204 [Issue:] 1-2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 203-219
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper builds on the literature about mixed-member electoral systems, exploring how ballot design interacts with voter behavior. We present a theoretical model for vote decision-making in mixed-member systems that takes into account the interaction between both tiers. The model is grounded in a spatial model for vote decision-making under risk and inspired by the logic of portfolio diversification under risk. Accordingly, voters are modeled as risk-averse decision-makers who may prefer diversified vote packages (i.e. split-ticket) when party and candidate uncertainties are highly correlated. The risk diversification strategy abates when voters cast their votes sequentially. This finding provides a potential explanation for the impact of vote sequence in mixed-member systems, an under-investigated topic in the literature. It thus links the established literature on mixed-member systems with scholarship on ballot design and its effects. Additionally, the paper's analysis explores the implications of combining the proposed model with the well-established wasted vote model.
Schlagwörter: 
Mixed-member systems
Vote decision under uncertainty
Risk diversification
Vote sequence.
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