Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330314 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 25-050
Publisher: 
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, Mannheim
Abstract: 
In a model of asymmetric regulation, a firm can comply with two regulatory targets, and a regulator can audit the firm for compliance. Inspection by the regulator is imperfect, and it assesses the firm's compliance with the targets with different success probabilities. The firm fully complies only if compliance costs are low. Otherwise, the firm always prioritizes the requirement that is easier to enforce. Expanding regulatory capacity positively affects compliance with the easy-to-enforce target; however, a higher capacity can harm compliance with the hard-to-enforce target.
Subjects: 
agency resources
asymmetric enforcement
compliance
multi-tasking
regulation
JEL: 
H32
K20
L51
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.