Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330155 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Journal of Economics & Management Strategy [ISSN:] 1530-9134 [Volume:] 34 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Wiley [Place:] Hoboken, NJ [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 782-793
Verlag: 
Wiley, Hoboken, NJ
Zusammenfassung: 
We demonstrate that the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profit from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but may have significant influence over the target's strategy. We show that the incentives for customer and input foreclosure can be higher, equal, or even lower with partial ownership than with a vertical merger, depending on how the protection of minority shareholders and transfer price regulations affect the scope for profit extraction.
Schlagwörter: 
foreclosure
minority shareholdings
partial ownership
profit shifting
vertical integration
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article
Dokumentversion: 
Published Version

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
501.95 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.