Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330144 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 30 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In symmetric games with externalities across coalitions, we investigate how three players form coalitions using two solutions: ๐งโˆ—, which is a focal prediction of coalition structure in a class of noncooperative coalitional bargaining games, and equilibrium binding agreements, which represent the cooperative blocking approach. We find that the coarsest equilibrium coalition structure (based on the latter notion) is never finer than ๐งโˆ—, and we provide a sufficient and necessary condition for these two solutions to generate the same coalition structure (i.e., the two solutions coincide if and only if the first coalition to form in ๐งโˆ— is not a two-player coalition or a particular condition about average coalitional worths is satisfied). In symmetric games with more than three players, we demonstrate through a series of examples that any relationship between these two solutions is possible. We also discuss symmetric games with positive externalities or equal division in which these two solutions coincide.
Subjects: 
coalition formation
symmetry
externalities
efficiency
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.