Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/325717 
Year of Publication: 
2022
Citation: 
[Journal:] Operations Research Perspectives [ISSN:] 2214-7160 [Volume:] 9 [Article No.:] 100218 [Year:] 2022 [Pages:] 1-12
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
This study compiled a Bayesian inspection game as a branch in game theory to deal with non-performing loans (NPLs). Three types of games are analyzed, which are false alarm (FA), non-detection (ND), and bull's eye (BE). A Bayesian Nash equilibrium calculation process took place to formulate the player's strategy proportion. The equilibrium solution indicates the causative factors and develops the strategies to anticipate NPLs. The identified factors causing NPLs include customers' utility and disutility, inspection error in the form of false alarm and non-detection, operational costs to conduct an inspection, and bank utility related to inspection. The results showed that some examinations of type I and II errors to the game model could provide more comprehensive and interesting insights in managing NPL problems.
Subjects: 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Game theory
Inspection game
Non-performing loan
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.