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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 750
Verlag: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Zusammenfassung: 
Berge equilibrium offers an alternative to Nash equilibrium in game theory, emphasizing cooperative stability rather than individual optimization. Despite recent interest, a systematic study of Berge equilibria in finite normal form games is still lacking, with fundamental questions like existence remaining open. This paper characterizes Berge equilibria through a polynomial system of equations, enabling computational algebra and algebraic geometry methods to analyze them. Algorithms based on Gröbner bases determine the existence and computation of Berge equilibria. Furthermore, we show that the set of games admitting completely mixed Berge equilibria is contained within a determinantal variety, whose dimension we explicitly bound from above.
Schlagwörter: 
Berge equilibrium
Algebraic Methods in Economics
Gröbner Bases
JEL: 
C72
C02
C63
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Dokumentart: 
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