Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/323665 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Dynamic Games and Applications [ISSN:] 2153-0793 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 664-692
Verlag: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
While the general theory for the terminal-initial value problem in mean-field games is widely used in many models of applied mathematics, the modeling potential of the corresponding forward-forward version is still under-considered. In this work, we discuss some features of the problem in a quite general setting and explain how it may be appropriate to model a system of players that have a complete knowledge of the past states of the system and are adapting to new information without any knowledge about the future. Then we show how forward-forward mean field games can be effectively used in mathematical models for opinion formation and other social phenomena.
Schlagwörter: 
Mean-Field Games
Hamilton-Jacobi equations
Fokker-Planck equations
Social mathematical models
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