Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322935 
Year of Publication: 
2015
Series/Report no.: 
U.S.E. Discussion Papers Series No. 15-09
Publisher: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Abstract: 
In the two-player electronic mail game (EMG), as is well-known, the probability of collective action is lower the more confirmations and re-confirmations are made available to players. In the multi-player EMG, however, as we show players may coordinate on equilibria where they require only few of the available confirmations from each other to act. In this case, increasing the number of available may either create equilibria with positive probability of collective action when none existed before, or may increase the probability of collective action, if equilibria with positive probability of collective action already existed for fewer available confirmations.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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