Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322935 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2015
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
U.S.E. Discussion Papers Series No. 15-09
Verlag: 
Utrecht University, Utrecht School of Economics, Tjalling C. Koopmans Research Institute, Utrecht
Zusammenfassung: 
In the two-player electronic mail game (EMG), as is well-known, the probability of collective action is lower the more confirmations and re-confirmations are made available to players. In the multi-player EMG, however, as we show players may coordinate on equilibria where they require only few of the available confirmations from each other to act. In this case, increasing the number of available may either create equilibria with positive probability of collective action when none existed before, or may increase the probability of collective action, if equilibria with positive probability of collective action already existed for fewer available confirmations.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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