Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322509 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11947
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
To empirically assess how physicians respond to financial incentives, we leverage a quasi-natural experiment in France where most GPs' fees are regulated. In 2017, a wide-scale regulatory change caused the price of a visit to increase from €23 to €25. Relying on granular claims data covering the universe of patients, doctors, and visits, we show that physician activity grew by nearly 9% after the price increase, yielding a unitary price elasticity of healthcare provision. The number of distinct patients examined increased substantially, while the provision of medical services per patient hardly changed, resulting in a slight increase in physicians' number of days worked. Drug prescription per patient is also shown to decrease, suggesting that the policy was cost-effective and enhanced access to healthcare, with limited adverse effects. Early-career physicians responded strongly to these financial incentives, while later-career physicians hardly changed their labor supply behavior.
Subjects: 
physician labor supply
financial incentives
claims data
access to healthcare
medical spending
JEL: 
I11
I18
J44
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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