Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322485 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11923
Verlag: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a framework in which both a principal and an agent care about a social mission, such as addressing social or environmental concerns. The agent requires financing and must satisfy a budget constraint. Under incomplete information, in addition to the usual quantity distortions for inefficient agents, the principal also distorts the mission upward for efficient agents and downward for inefficient ones. In our context, the existence of hidden types may improve total welfare compared to complete information, as screening incentivizes the principal to propose a contract with a higher mission to reduce the rent of more efficient types. Our results apply to social enterprises and triple bottom line environments, contributing to the theoretical understanding of the impact of non-financial incentives on optimal contracting.
Schlagwörter: 
impact investment
mission motivation
incentives
social enterprises
corporate social responsibility
JEL: 
D21
L21
L31
D82
M14
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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