Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/322481 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 11919
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
The proposed revision of the Swiss Banking Act introduces a public liquidity backstop (PLB) for distressed systemically important banks (SIBs), in part to facilitate resolution. We examine the impact of the PLB on fiscal balances, welfare, and the incentives of bank shareholders and management. A PLB, like too-big-tofail (TBTF) status, acts as a subsidy for non-convertible bonds, which can create negative externalities. Corrective measures should be implemented before the PLB is activated to align incentives with societal interests. We conservatively estimate that UBS Group's TBTF status results in funding cost reductions of at least USD 2.9 billion in 2022. The risk for Switzerland of hosting SIBs warrants additional precautionary savings.
Subjects: 
PLB
TBTF
liquidity support
bank
JEL: 
E42
E58
G28
G38
H81
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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