Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320434 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
SAFE Working Paper No. 449
Publisher: 
Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, Frankfurt a. M.
Abstract: 
How does polarization - as measured by mistreatment of political rivals - spread? In an online experiment, participants choose between splitting financial resources equally or discriminating against a member of the opposing political party. We vary the information subjects receive about others' choices and justifications for discrimination. Exposure to extreme justifications for discrimination increases discrimination - particularly in a polarized environment, when many others are already discriminating - and it leads participants to adopt more extreme justifications themselves. Our findings suggest a self-reinforcing dynamic that may fuel polarization: Exposure to extreme statements increases polarization and the prevalence of extreme reasoning.
Subjects: 
political polarization
peer effects
justifications
outgroup discrimination
social norms
JEL: 
C9
D01
D9
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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