Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/320291 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 20 [Issue:] 2 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 481-509
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This study investigates efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms for allocating indivisible goods under constraints. First, we examine a setting without endowments. In this setting, we introduce a class of constraints-ordered accessibility-for which the serial dictatorship (SD) mechanism is Pareto-efficient (PE), individually rational (IR), and group strategy-proof (GSP). Then we prove that accessibility is a necessary condition for the existence of PE, IR, and GSP mechanisms. Moreover, we show an example where the SD mechanism with a dynamically constructed order satisfies PE, IR, and GSP if one school has an arbitrary accessible constraint and each of the other schools has a capacity constraint. Second, we examine a setting with endowments. We find that the generalized matroid is a necessary and sufficient condition on the constraint structure for the existence of a mechanism that is PE, IR, and strategy-proof. We also demonstrate that a top trading cycles mechanism satisfies PE, IR, and GSP under any generalized matroid constraint. Finally, we observe that any two out of the three properties-PE, IR, and GSP-can be achieved under general constraints.
Subjects: 
Matching with constraints
efficient matching
generalized matroid
strategy-proofness
JEL: 
C78
D47
D71
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.